Norad

Evaluation of five Humanitarian Programs of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the Standby Roster NORCAP

Case Country Report - South Sudan

Report 4/2013

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Ternstrom Consulting

in collaboration with Channel Research

2013

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
ALP	Accelerated Learning Programme
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund (Country-specific)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development (UK Aid)
DFAIT	Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
EFSD	Emergency Food Security and Distribution
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FSL	Food Security and Livelihood
HAPPDA	Humanitarian Assistance and Protection to People Displaced in Africa
ICLA	Information, Counselling and Legal Advice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INGO	International Non Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
LFA	Logical Framework Analysis
NBeG	Northern Bahr e Ghazal
NFI	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NMFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NORCAP	Norwegian Capacity
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking Survey
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive Summary

This Case Country Report for South Sudan is part of an evaluation of five core competencies of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and NORCAP (Norwegian Capacity) commissioned by Norad. Its prime purpose is to generate evidence and field-based data regarding NRC operations to be used in the overall synthesis report. Recommendations presented below are therefore primarily country specific.

The evaluation covers the period 2010 - 2012 and was conducted by Ternstrom Consulting AB in association with Channel Research Ltd. The field visits were conducted by a team of four consultants; Björn Ternström (Team Leader), Charles Byamugisha (International consultant and Lead Consultant South Sudan), Japhet Makongo (Public Expenditure Tracking Survey consultant) and Leben Moro (Local Consultant). The planning of the field work was done in dialogue with NRC, which provided logistics and security during field visits. The evaluation team split up in order to be able to cover both Northern Bahr e Ghazal and Warrap state.

The overall objective guiding NRC's work is: "to enhance protection and promote the rights of displaced people in humanitarian need by improving living conditions and seeking durable solutions". NRC's current plans include implementing programmes within four of its five core competencies in South Sudan: Emergency Food Security and Distribution (food production, diet diversification and vocational training), Information Counselling and Legal Advice (ICLA clinics, community-based land and property trainings and protection monitoring), Shelter (emergency shelter, school construction) including Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (latrines, boreholes and awareness), as well as Education (not covered in this report). There were no Camp Management activities during the period covered by this case study.

NRC commenced operations in South Sudan in 2004 and has since expanded in Central Equatoria in 2007, to Northern Bahr e Ghazal in 2010, and to Warrap state in 2011. The organisation also carries out mobile activities in Western Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria and Lakes states. The NRC country office is located in Juba with field offices in Aweil, Alek, Turalei and Kwajok. NRC is considering expanding to Tonj East county and Renk. At the time of the evaluation NRC had approximately 20 on-going projects funded by 9 different donors. The budget for 2012 was 100 million NOK, which is the same amount as for 2011, a doubling compared to 2010 (42 million NOK) and a quadrupling compared to 2009 (27 million NOK). By end of 2012, NRC had a total of 29 international staff and 335 national staff in South Sudan.

Management

NRC globally has well established systems and structures. There are policies in relevant areas, practical guidelines, a culture of investment in staff training as well as checks and balances in management procedures. In South Sudan these systems and structures have been challenged in a number of ways. Support systems have not kept up with the expansion of activities and this has impacted both on the organisation and its activities. Problems identified by the evaluation team include gaps in leadership, unclear roles and responsibilities, inadequate finance, procurement, logistics and human resource structures.

In response to the multilayered problems described above NRC, in the summer of 2012, decided to invest in "surge capacity". This involved significant technical and managerial support. Systems are gradually improving in response to this investment.

Shelter, including Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

NRC shelter activities were in line with beneficiaries' needs and overall the programme is achieving its intended outputs. There are unsolved issues relating to land and natural resources however and localised competition over resources affected the relationship between returnees and host communities negatively.

The shelter project SDFS1001 in Aweil includes school construction and education. The construction component of this project was the subject for the Public Expenditure Tracking Survey conducted. The objective relating to school construction was to provide beneficiaries with an appropriate learning environment by construction of school infrastructure and training facilities with a total budget of NOK 12 million. It has achieved its planned outputs. The project had a standard package of deliverables/outputs which led to underutilisation in some areas and overcrowding in others. A separate public expenditure tracking report for one project in each of the Case Countries has been produced.

Participation and contribution made by local communities are considered to be key elements of efficient utilisation of NRC's external resource support. However, the community contribution has not been estimated in proposals and reporting. It was therefore not possible to make a comparison of the partners' contribution (in percentage terms) to the project.

NRC integrated WASH into the Shelter programme as a gradual process to develop it into a fully fledged program. Implementation was delayed due to staffing problems and, in Warrap, project design was based on a number of faulty assumptions, reducing effectiveness.

Emergency Food Security and Distribution (EFSD)

EFSD in South Sudan is comprised mainly of Food Security and Livelihood (FSL) activities in Northern Bahr e Ghazal and Warrap. These activities include providing returnees, IDPs and host communities with agricultural inputs, training in agricultural practices and vocational training as well as awareness raising in diet diversity, food hygiene and tree planting (to limit environmental degradation).

Project activities are designed for a mix of targets groups including vulnerable individuals, farmers groups, schools and local authorities. The intention is to benefit returnees/IDPs and host communities aiming for a 75-25 distribution between the groups. In some cases host communities did not receive that share of support.

The team looked at EFSD projects in Alek, in Warrap State, where NRC has been implementing Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) since January 2011. The framework agreement with Sida enabled the organisation to set up an Emergency and Preparedness Response (EPR) team with pre-positioned NFI stock in Northern Bahr e Ghazal and Warrap States. In consequence, NRC was able to be a major frontline actor in this crisis, responding to the massive influx of populations into both states, especially during the referendum period (returnees) and the Abyei crisis (IDPs) in May/June 2011.

The food security programme was relevant to beneficiaries but not fully according to their priorities. Project reporting reflects high output target achievement, but also significant delays in distributions. Selection of seeds was not always locally suitable. Reporting is at times inconsistent and difficult to interpret.

The EFSD programme in Alek was overly ambitious contributing to overall programme relevance being compromised by weak implementation. Projects started rather late and had limited logistical, administrative and human resource capacity. The planning process was rushed and built on low quality baseline studies and limited consultation with beneficiaries. This was caused in part by high staff turnover and slow recruitment of key staff members.

Currently, there is a poor relationship between NRC and local authorities in Warrap State. Some key informants attributed this to conflicts of interest arising from local authorities' high expectations to benefit from tendering opportunities and recruitment of local staff.

Information Counselling and Legal Advice (ICLA)

The ICLA programme is the oldest of NRC programs in South Sudan and was established in 2004. It is mainly implemented in three States: Central Equatoria, Northern Bahr e Ghazal and Warrap. Main donors are NMFA, Danida, DFAIT Canada and UNHCR. The team had

the opportunity to visit the ICLA project SDFL1102 in Alek and interviewed ICLA staff and stakeholders in Aweil. The programme is run by one international programme manager, three international project coordinators and over 50 national programme staff. The programme has recently opened in Warrap.

Housing, land and property issues are core to the programme and NRC in South Sudan plays a lead role in this area. Activities include: training, information, legal counselling, dispute resolution, coordination and technical support to relevant stakeholders. Outcome objectives are to a) increase beneficiary (IDPs, returnees and host community) access to formal and informal justice systems, knowledge of reintegration services and national protection mechanisms and capacity to access them and, b) carry out effective and targeted advocacy in relation to rights-based issues.

There was a clear consensus among stakeholders that the ICLA programme in South Sudan is relevant and effective. The programme has developed in dialogue with the government and NRC was cited as having a significant role in the process of drafting the Land Law, as well as in its dissemination at various levels of government.

NRC is the only agency implementing ICLA in Warrap and Northern Bahr e Ghazal. According to project documents, objectives have been largely achieved, although Juba-based staff are challenged to keep up with the number of ongoing client processes.

Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency

Overall, NRC projects in South Sudan as presented and reported in project documents are clearly relevant to the needs of the affected target groups in the areas where NRC is active. They are also implemented in extremely challenging operational circumstances and are in line with the Consolidated Appeal Process and cluster priorities. The organisation's ability to implement its activities, and expand at the rate it has done so, should be respected.

There were exceptions where inappropriate implementation lessened relevance as described in sections below.

The ICLA programme is regarded as highly effective and its activities were consistently lauded by the various stakeholders, ranging from beneficiaries to Government and UN representatives. NRC contributions to cluster structures and other coordination efforts were widely recognised as effective.

The effectiveness of the school construction component of the shelter programme was lessened by a standardised approach which in some cases led to overcrowding or underutilisation. Meanwhile, donor flexibility allowed preparedness in emergency shelter, making post Abyei-disturbance interventions timely. Chosen building materials were locally adapted.

Due partly to weak support systems and partly to complex circumstances, NRC did not maintain consistent quality across core competencies and locations. Effectiveness varied between and within core competencies, according to circumstances.

NRC support systems struggled to cope with the volume of activities as the organisation had seriously underestimated the resources needed for support systems, compromising efficiency. Multiple capacity gaps, outlined in the separate section on Management, have increased costs and decreased output. While we have not been able to quantify this, cost implications are likely to have been substantial.

NRC had recognised the gaps in support systems and was investing to rectify them. At the time of the evaluation, things were improving but a lot remained to be addressed.

Sustainability and Connectedness

NRC interventions in South Sudan are not sustainable but, given the context, are well connected. Efforts to be connected include investing in coordination and capacity building of local authorities and affected communities.

Cross-cutting issues

Project design commonly includes gendered targets for both activities and beneficiary selection. Project proposals and reports are disaggregated by gender. The team encountered several examples of project adaptation due to gendered feedback.

Activities designed to mitigate environmental damage, focused on awareness raising and tree sapling distribution, are included in the country programme. Environmental impact assessments have not been conducted, neither in needs assessments nor in reporting.

NRC practices a policy of zero tolerance on corruption. Interviews with staff confirmed a strict code of conduct which has been consistently followed. The NRC anticorruption stance is principled and backed up by management, as confirmed in a number of staff interviews.

Conclusions and recommendations

NRC operations in South Sudan have been relevant in relation to needs and context. Activities have expanded rapidly in terms of volume, geographical coverage and programming complexity. The projects have been implemented under very difficult operational circumstances and NRC should be respected for achievements made.

On the other hand, support systems have not kept up with the rapid expansion. The gaps that have developed have been serious enough to impact the quality of programming, lessening effectiveness.

Our main recommendations are that NRC South Sudan should:

- focus on consolidation;
- systematically seek synergies and exploit potential for interaction between core competencies in current geographical areas of operation;
- continue to invest in cluster structures and coordination;
- continue to invest in capacity building of government structures;
- make an inventory of existing Food Security and Livelihood and WASH capacities outside the organisation and seek to establish complementary relationships.

1 Introduction and Background

This Case Country Report for South Sudan is part of an evaluation of five core competencies of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and NORCAP commissioned by Norad. Its prime purpose is to generate evidence and field-based data regarding NRC operations. Such evidence will then be used as the basis for findings, conclusions and recommendations in the overall synthesis report. In this report, we focus on findings, and only present recommendations that are highly country specific. Recommendations of a more systemic nature will be presented in the main evaluation report.

The team visited South Sudan between 3 and 13 October 2012. The reader should be aware that difficult logistical and security conditions cause restrictions on both NRC's activities and the way the evaluation has been carried out. For example, we have not been able to interact with the target population to the extent that would be normal in an evaluation. Similarly, we have not been able to select projects for detailed scrutiny at random, decreasing the extent to which the results can be generalised. We have also had to rely to a large extent on NRC, the organisation being evaluated, for arranging meetings, providing transportation and security details and in a few cases translators. This affects the reliability of results but has not been possible to avoid. The evaluation team greatly appreciates the support from NRC, and acknowledges that without it, it would not have been possible at all to visit the field.

The evaluation was conducted by Ternstrom Consulting AB in association with Channel Research Ltd. The field visits were conducted by a team of four consultants; Björn Ternström (Team Leader), Charles Byamugisha (International consultant and Lead Consultant South Sudan), Japhet Makongo (PETS[1] consultant) and Leben Moro (Local Consultant). The team was supported by interpreters and enumerators, recruited locally. The planning of the field work was done in dialogue with NRC, which provided logistics and security during field visits. This was unavoidable given the security situation, the limited availability of transportation, and a concern for possible negative effects on NRC's activities from the presence of the evaluation team. The evaluation team split up in order to be able to cover both Northern Bahr e Ghazal and Warrap state.

1.1 Purpose and Scope

The purpose of the evaluation of which this Case Country Study is a part is to 'contribute to the improvement of NRC and NORCAP activities'[2]. It aims to provide knowledge about the present and past situation and to facilitate integration of knowledge within NRC and NORCAP through learning.

The evaluation has five objectives: to *i)* assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of five of NRC's core activities in three countries; *ii)* assess the quality of NORCAP responses (relevance and efficiency); *iii)* assess the existence of synergies between NRC and NORCAP activities; *iv)* provide scope for learning at different levels and; *v)* make recommendations regarding *a)* making WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene) a new core competence; *b)* improvements in design and implementation of NRC core activities and; *c)* improvements in NORCAP's competencies.

This report addresses mainly the first objective for one of the selected case countries; i.e. to assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of five of NRC's core activities in South Sudan. The remaining objectives will be addressed in the main evaluation report, including findings based on interviews with NORCAP secondees, which will be presented together with findings from interviews with NORCAP secondees in other case countries, via Skype and through an online survey.

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[1] PETS: Public expenditure tracking survey.

[2] ToR for the study.

The period to be covered is 2010 to 2012. The aim of the evaluation is to provide insight into programme design, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation during this period and to assess the *relevance, effectiveness and efficiency* of overall programmes and individual projects. The evaluation team has sought to examine not just what *outputs* have been achieved in country programmes but the wider *outcomes.* However, all three countries that were selected as country case studies (Somalia, South Sudan and Pakistan) are countries where political and humanitarian situations are highly dynamic and where security challenges can affect NRC programmes as well as evaluation methods. This, together with the nature of NRC's activities, has affected the extent to which it has been possible to examine outcomes.

The scope of the part of the evaluation covered in this case country report is thus NRC's activities within its core competencies Shelter, Camp management, ICLA (Information, Counselling and Legal Advice), Emergency Food Security and Distribution (EFSD) and WASH. NRC has no Camp management activities in South Sudan, hence four core activities remain. The scope of the South Sudan field visit was further narrowed to selected projects in areas that were possible to visit given constraints in time, logistics and security. Hence, the field visit covered selected ICLA, EFSD, Shelter and WASH activities in the areas of Northern Bahr e Ghazal and Warrap states. The evaluation team also interviewed NORCAP secondees and a NORCAP host organisation representative.

The main users of the evaluation are NMFA, Norad and Sida, NRC staff and partners at different levels of programme management in Juba (Central Equatoria), Aweil (Northern Bahr e Ghazal state) and Alek (Warrap state) and NRC headquarters in Oslo.

1.2 Country context

In 2005, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Government of Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), formally ending decades of war. Six years later, on 9 July 2011, Southern Sudan gained independence following a peaceful referendum held on 9 January 2011. Their long-held dream of freedom achieved, the about 8.26 million South Sudanese, who inhabit 644,329 square kilometres of territory, looked to the future with hope for dividends of peace, including the benefits accruing from abundant natural resources, particularly oil (National Bureau of Statistics 2012). The nascent state had to develop the capacity and institutions to deal with the legacies of the war and emerging challenges. Foreign nations, the UN, international organisations and local organisations have all devoted efforts and resources to help the new country deal with the past and work toward a prosperous future.

During the war, an estimated two million people died, and another four million were uprooted from their homes, the majority of them fleeing north to seek refuge in camps set up on the outskirts of the national capital, Khartoum (US Committee for Refugees 2003). Humanitarian organisations provided support that enabled them to cope with camp life. After the war ended, many of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) sought to return to their places of origin. The majority of returnees headed for states that lie along the border between South Sudan and Sudan, such as Upper Nile, Unity and Northern Bahr e Ghazal (NBeG). Since the beginning of the year, IOM (International Organisation for Migration) has recorded 123,000 returnees, many of them settled in the so-called 'high return states' – or states where there have been high numbers of returning IDPs and refugees - along the border (IOM 2012a).

Some of the people uprooted from their homes in Southern Sudan during the war crossed international borders to seek refuge in other countries, especially neighbouring ones. The majority of refugees ended up in camps in Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. When conditions back home improved, many of them joined repatriation programmes organised by the UNHCR, asylum countries and the country of origin. They mainly returned to states which share borders with the asylum countries, such as Central Equatoria and Jonglei.

Many people did not leave Southern Sudan during the war and many became internally displaced within the war zone. International community efforts to assist included, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which sought to support people who were not able to leave the war zone (Karim et al 1996). Some of the organisations that took part in that humanitarian programme are still active in South Sudan. When the war ended, the IDPs who remained in Southern Sudan also needed assistance to fully reintegrate into their original villages.

The return home of refugees and IDPs took place against a background of hostile conditions. Many people, including some returnees, continue to be displaced from their villages because of violence linked to tense relations between the newly independent South Sudan and Sudan, cattle rustling, inter- and intra-ethnic clashes, Lord's Resistance Army and other armed groups, land and border disputes, and other drivers of violence. By August 2011, more than 3,070 people had been killed in inter-communal and militia-related violence and 304,400 had been displaced (UNHCR 2012).

Clashes in the contested area of Abyei caused displacement to NBeG and Warrap. These states had to accommodate such IDPs while simultaneously receiving their own people. NBeG, which has received 456,542 returnees since 2007, is worst affected (IOM 2012a). NRC and other humanitarian organisations have provided much-needed food, emergency shelter, health care, and other necessities. Operations take place in an unpredictable environment. For example, the recent heavy rains caused floods in NBeG and Warrap, rendering movement of people and aid workers difficult. Many people, including recently arrived returnees, were cut off from relief aid.

Government institutions are developing. The legislative, judicial and executive branches of the government have been formed (Government of the Republic of South Sudan 2012). The legislature is comprised of the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), which has 332 members, and the Council of States, made up of 50 members. The Judiciary, although established, is very weak and rule of law is absent in many parts of South Sudan. The executive is also in place, implementing government policies and programmes. Included in the executive is a ministry responsible for humanitarian affairs and disaster management. Its operations are supported by the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), whose origins are traceable to the war years. However, at the state and local levels, these institutions are weak and the government has not satisfactorily met needs for basic services, such as food, education, health care, and roads (Cook and Moro 2012). This has accentuated returnees' integration difficulties in their original homes areas.

There have been warnings about critical food shortages during the year 2012. WFP and FAO predicted that for 2012, 4.7 million South Sudanese will be food-insecure, an increase with 1.4 million from the previous year, and the number of severely food-insecure will reach one million, as compared to 900,000 in 2011 (IRIN 2012). The need for emergency food was therefore likely to rise in late 2012. Currently, a lot of the food consumed in urban areas, especially Juba, originates from Uganda and other neighbouring countries.

In areas of Warrap bordering Unity State, cattle rustling frequently causes misery for people. This problem is made worse by incursions of rebel groups. In the neighbouring Jonglei State, the situation is even worse, caused by a mix of militia atrocities and cattle rustling. For example, the IOM reported that 140,000 people were affected by tribal clashes in Jonglei in December 2011 (IOM 2012b). Inadequate health facilities and water sources also affect many communities across Central Equatoria, NBeG and Warrap.

The poor provision of basic services persists despite large amounts of petro dollars that, until recently, strengthened government coffers. President Salva Kiir has long decried the rampant corruption in government institutions and has adopted a zero-tolerance to corruption policy (Garang 2010). The anti-corruption measures have had limited effect on the problem however.

In January 2012 oil production was shut off, resulting from a bitter row between leaders of the Sudan and South Sudan, pushing the economy towards total collapse. The repercussions for ordinary citizens were catastrophic. In states like Northern Bahr e Ghazal, prices skyrocketed, leaving many families destitute and humanitarian operations in distress. However, this situation will likely get better as the leaders of the two countries have seemingly learned lessons from their recent actions, and are engaging in serious and meaningful negotiations.

1.3 NRC in South Sudan[3]

NRC first operated a country office in Khartoum in 2004 and has been working in Southern Sudan since 2005 with an office established in Juba in 2006. Following its abrupt expulsion from the North of Sudan in 2009, NRC was able to continue with its activities in Southern Sudan and therefore its country office was relocated to Juba in 2009. Operations were expanded in Central Equatoria in 2007, NBeG in 2010, Warrap state in 2011.

NRC's current plans include implementing programmes in four of its five core competencies in South Sudan: Shelter including WASH, Food Security, Education, and (ICLA) Information Counselling and Legal Advice (but not Camp Management). ICLA centres have been key to establishing linkages with local communities, to other NRC core programmes directly supporting sustainable reintegration through Education, Shelter and Food Security activities.[4] NRC has a presence in Central Equatoria, NBeG and Warrap states and carries out mobile activities in Western Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria and Lakes states. The country office is located in Juba with field offices in Aweil, Alek, Turalei and Kwajok.

At the time of the evaluation NRC had approximately 20 on-going projects funded by 9 different donors.[5] The budget for 2012 was[6] 100 million NOK, which is the same amount as for 2011, a doubling compared to 2010 (42 million NOK) and a quadrupling compared to 2009 (27 million NOK). These numbers correspond to USD 17 million for 2012 and 2011, USD 7 million for 2010 and USD 4.5 million for 2009.[7] By the end of 2012, NRC had a total of 29 international staff and 335 national staff in South Sudan. NRC is considering expanding to Tonj East county and Renk.

The table below shows the planned beneficiaries and budget allocated to each core competency for 2012.

Core Competency	Beneficiaries	Total projected budget, NOK
ICLA	29,535	18,046,424
Shelter/WASH	24,850	16,835,389
Food Security	10,300	18,989,529
Education	6,090	43,217,439

Figure 1: NRC's planned coverage in South Sudan, 2012. Source: NRC Strategy for South Sudan, 2012-2014 (Final Draft March, 2012). The projected disaggregated figure for male to female ratio is a 50:50 split.

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[3] Information in this section, including budget data, is drawn from the NRC Fact Sheet South Sudan, Country Strategy and other internal documents.

[4] Danida Project Proposal 2010-11, triangulated in interviews with staff.

[5] The donors are: CHF, DFID, EC, ECHO, NORAD, NMFA, Sida, UNHCR and NRC Private Donations.

[6] In February, source South Sudan Fact Sheet 2012.

[7] The exchange rate used throughout this report is: US$1/NOK 5.6. In tables, we use M to indicate million.

1.4 Document review

A number of documents describing and analysing the general situation in South Sudan or thematically were reviewed prior to the field work, and confirm the need for the type of activities that NRC are undertaking in South Sudan - for example the UN Consolidated Appeals for the years 2011 and 2012 (UN 2011 and 2012). The Report on Food Security and Nutrition in South Sudan (WFP, 2012) confirms NRC operational areas as vulnerable.

Background information on NRC's operations in South Sudan was drawn from various NRC documents, e.g. the NRC South Sudan Fact Sheet 2012 and the NRC South Sudan Country Strategy 2012 – 2014. NRC proposals and reports, mainly quarterly, covering the latter years under review gave additional information about activities planned and implemented. The NRC website www.nrc.no, gives an overview of NRC's mission, standards and policies. The internal documents reviewed are mainly project specific. They gave the team an idea of how NRC staff use guidelines, policies, activities, reports and monitoring for project activities.

A number of project documents were made available by NRC. A full list of documents that the team has had access to is available in Annex 2. The majority of these have been consulted. Please note that this list mainly uses the internal NRC names for documents.

2   Research Strategy and Methodology

In this section we briefly describe the research strategy and methods used, and comment on reliability and validity of the results. Our task has been to examine NRC's activities at field and country level. The terms of reference focus on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, as well as cross-cutting issues. We have aimed at collecting data in a way that fulfils the DAC[8] criteria, despite the difficulties in making first-hand observations and interviewing beneficiaries.

In line with DAC criteria, interpreted through the ALNAP[9] Guide for evaluating humanitarian action (Beck 2006), the team's overall evaluation strategy was to conduct a systematic and impartial examination of NRC's humanitarian action intended to draw lessons to improve policy and practice and enhance accountability.

As suggested in the ALNAP Guide, the DAC criteria were used as complementary to each other. This meant that, for example, in evaluating effectiveness the team not only sought to determine if objectives had been met but whether they were appropriate to the context and beneficiary caseload in question, whether they were met efficiently, were sustainable and complementary to other interventions – both NRC's and other actors' activities.

The evaluation looked at r*elevance* to determine the extent to which NRC's interventions were priority activities according to the needs of beneficiaries and in line with NRC's core competencies. For *appropriateness*, the team looked mainly at context, seeking to determine if the kind of activity implemented was right for particular events or phases of the humanitarian emergency, opportunities and constraints present at the time, if project interventions were designed with the participation of beneficiaries and were culturally and conflict sensitive.

Within the scope of the relevance and appropriateness aspect of the evaluation the team also looked at connectedness. The analysis of c*onnectedness* was mainly concerned with NRC's internal connectedness between its own programmes and with the activities of other partners, including local authorities (also a coordination aspect).

The team examined *effectiveness*, i.e. the extent to which NRC projects had achieved their objectives, through a variety of techniques. Questions related to *efficiency* focused mainly on

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[8] Development Assistance Committee.
[9] Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance.

the tools that NRC used to ensure that inputs were used and/or procured and the system of checks and balances. Consideration was also given to the capacity of the organisation to utilise the management tools provided from Oslo.

In addition the team triangulated information from NRC's documents and statements concerning sustainability and exit strategies in interviews with various stakeholders. Cross-cutting issues were included to assess how they contributed to meeting the DAC criteria: Gender, Age, Disability and Corruption were specified in the Terms of Reference.

2.1 Focus on Systems and Processes

We have described and assessed what NRC has accomplished. Evaluation field access has been severely limited. In order to partially compensate for this we have examined NRC systems and processes, assessing whether NRC has the organisational capacity to accomplish their objectives and whether they can show that such capacity is being used.

We have assessed if a certain activity is or was relevant to the intended beneficiaries by interviewing different stakeholders and by exploring if selected outputs were in line with for example the Consolidated Appeals Process and cluster recommendations. We have also looked at the systems in place for assessing relevance, such as baseline studies, needs analyses, interaction with stakeholders. Finally, we have looked at documented evidence of the use of such methods and asked in interviews with various stakeholders if they have been used.

The question of whether a certain activity has achieved the intended results (effectiveness) has been approached at three different levels: we started by looking at plans and reports, making observations and interviewing different stakeholders to find out if the results have in fact been achieved. Secondly, we examined if NRC has the necessary "tools" for implementing and measuring the intended results, such as a system for reporting and follow-up, necessary staffing and skills etc. Thirdly, we compared reports, internal evaluations, and interviews with staff, other organisations, implementing partners and beneficiaries to find out if, and to what extent, they know about these tools and if/to what extent they are actually being used.

For efficiency, a similar approach was adopted, assessing if activities have been implemented and results achieved in an efficient way (i.e. relating the achieved results to the resources spent). The evaluation context has limited the extent of this analysis – partly because the evaluation team has not been able to visit market places to cross-check local prices for goods supplied. We have paid attention to the systems that enable an organisation to make choices that encourage efficiency, such as methods for monitoring and evaluation, the way financial and activities data are used in project management, etc. We have also analysed whether reports are used and acted upon, by looking at the reports, budgets and budget revisions, monitoring efforts actually implemented etc. and by interviewing relevant staff and stakeholders. Other evaluation topics, e.g. cross-cutting issues, have been approached in a similar way.

2.2 Impartiality vs. participation

Our initial intent was to add to the learning component by using elements of participatory evaluation, specifically by involving NRC staff (from non-evaluated projects) as research assistants. There is always a balance between learning and impartiality, and at the request of Norad, this strategy was changed and external enumerators brought onto the team.

In one interview made by Björn Ternström (Aweil) and for some Alek interviews it was not possible to find non-NRC translators. The translators translated both positive and negative comments about NRC and we found no reason to doubt the correctness of their translations.

Although this has not been a participatory evaluation, NRC has been heavily involved in the planning, preparation and implementation stages. As part of the learning component, we have had separate feedback sessions for the Juba management team prior to departure and for the Country Director on his return to South Sudan (22 Oct). Further reading and review has meant that additional information and conclusions are reflected in this report than at the said sessions.

2.3 Attribution of results

Attribution of results becomes more difficult the further along the chain from output to outcome to impact you move. The nature of NRC's planning, reporting and follow-up systems is such that there is little documented information that enables a comparison of "before" and "after" the intervention. Documented baseline studies and needs assessments are rare and reports show that planned efforts to assess results implemented are often delayed or made simpler. Planned and reported results are output focussed. However, a progression over time towards greater outcome focus is noted in planning.

Attribution of output is simple when NRC is the only organisation supplying a certain good or service - or supply goods that are easily identifiable. To address attribution of output in other cases, as well as outcome, the team has used a simplified version of the "most significant change" method. We asked interviewees what important changes have occurred in their lives. Based on responses we refocused the question on a certain theme, such as ICLA, and then used backwards tracing to ask for the reasons for this change in order to find out if the interviewee attributes the change to an activity undertaken by NRC. We have also asked for the effects of NRC activities. This gives information about both unintended effects and if the interviewee perceives that intended effects have been achieved.

The ideal target group for this kind of questioning is beneficiaries, and whenever possible such questions have been asked in interviews with beneficiaries. However, as the team had limited access to beneficiaries, and limited possibility to speak at length to them, we have mostly asked such questions in interviews with staff and other stakeholders.

A third way to approach attribution is to study the counterfactual, i.e. to ask what would have happened if the activity had not been implemented, or to compare the situation with a similar setting where the activity has not been implemented. The first way of approaching the counterfactual has the same limitations as the method described above, and in our view gives a more biased answer in that the activity is introduced to the respondent at the outset. The second approach is even less feasible given the security and logistical constraints, as it requires visits to more locations.

2.4 Data Collection

The table below shows the sources and methods that were used to extract and triangulate[10] information:

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[10] We understand the term 'triangulation' according to the OECD/DAC definition: 'the use of three or more theories, sources of information or types of analysis to verify and substantiate an assessment'.

Method	Source	Nature of Source	Reason for selection
Document review	Documents from internet research	General policy papers, humanitarian evaluations, humanitarian issues	To verify the general and sectorial conditions in South Sudan according to reports and issues papers. To learn from humanitarian evaluations concerning South Sudan or specific issues providing insights for questions needing to be asked
	Documents from NRC Oslo	Policy Papers, Financial Handbook, Guidance notes, country programmes	To assess the tools that guide field staff in their activities and triangulate the degree of their usefulness in the field
	Documents from NRC Field Offices	Project documents	Detailed review of project proposals, reports, logframes etc. to assess and triangulate in stakeholder interviews
Interviews	NRC staff at Head Office and regional office, Nairobi	Individual staff interviews	To learn how NRC works: programming, project design, procurement, monitoring and evaluation, administration, human resources, interaction with staff in country offices; to triangulate
	NRC staff in each Area Office	Individual staff interviews, sometimes with other (national) staff in project area: Area Coordinators, project, admin, finance/ procurement, human resources, monitoring and evaluation	To learn how NRC works at field office level as above, plus relations/ interaction with country office Juba and capacity-building; triangulate findings in projects; triangulate Head Office /country perspectives
	External partners	Representatives of UN agencies, NGOs and local authorities	To assess NRC's coordination, contribution to Clusters, information-sharing, pro-activity, cooperation, and to triangulate
	Beneficiaries	Representatives of beneficiaries	To triangulate; assess results, levels of satisfaction, capacity-building
	NORCAP secondees	NORCAP secondees to various organisations	To examine the experiences of NORCAP secondees.
Group Interviews/ Focus group discussions	Community leaders	Beneficiary representatives	To triangulate, assess satisfaction results, feedback, training
	Beneficiaries	Beneficiaries in different projects	To triangulate, assess results, satisfaction, capacity-building
	Visits to project sites	To verify physical components of outputs.	To triangulate information collected from other sources
Observations	NRC staff	NRC staff at different locations and levels	To triangulate data collected at respective site and discuss findings
Data sharing and joint analysis sessions	NRC staff	NRC staff at different locations and levels	To triangulate data collected at respective site and discuss findings

Figure 2: Data collection methods and sources.

To keep track of evaluation questions, an Evaluation Question Matrix, which included all questions from the ToR and the team's approach and method to answer them, was developed during the inception phase of the evaluation along with stakeholder adapted sets of methods and questions. From these, interview checklists including questions adjusted to different target groups were developed and used to guide interviews. A data collection guide was developed to help keep the team focussed on the key topics of the evaluation. A Dropbox (internet location for team sharing of documents) was used to share relevant documents. Pre-field work team meetings allowed contextualisation and to develop questionnaires. Data and evidence was compiled and shared in the team, mainly through the matrix and Dropbox mentioned above.

The team also carried out a Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) to follow the flow of financial resources in a selected project and area; Shelter/Education (school construction) activities in Aweil. This is reported on in a separate document.

Before the field work began, the team developed a list of people or functions that we wished to interview, and asked for NRC's help in identifying these and setting up interviews. During field work, additional stakeholders were identified and interviewed. It should be noted that the organisational setup of partners and local authorities in field locations accessible in the time frame of the evaluation is such that the number of formal stakeholder representatives was quite limited[11], implying that a large proportion of those available were in fact interviewed.

Semi structured interviews were conducted based on the interview checklists. We obtained information regarding NRC's performance on its core competencies from a variety of sources, triangulating as we went along. For example, a question concerning 'effectiveness' in an Emergency Food Distribution core competence would be picked up from a project report[12], then we would question the relevant NRC staff member about it (sometimes more than one staff, for example, the Area manager and thematic advisor) and triangulate it with community leaders, beneficiaries and local partners where possible. Throughout the study a total of about 80 people were interviewed. A list of interviewees can be found in Annex 1, and a list of documents in Annex 2.

2.5 Selection of projects

The team was informed that the projects summarised below were being implemented by NRC during the period covered by the evaluation. The project code is NRC's internal project reference numbering, where the first two letters refer to country (SD), the second two to the type of activity (food = FK, shelter = FS, ICLA =FL, Education = FT, FM = Frame programme), the first two digits indicate year and the last two refer to the individual project number:

Project Code/ Location	Amount MNOK	Dates	Sector	Donor
SDFL 1102 Warrap	6.5 MNOK	1Jan - 31Dec,10	ICLA	NMFA
SDFM 1001	10.0 MNOK	1Jan-31Dec,10	ICLA-EFSD	NMFA
SDFL 1101 NBeG	7.4 MDKK	1Jan-31Dec,10	ICLA: Legal Assistance	Danida
SDFL 1001 NbeG	8.8 MDKK	1Jan-31Dec,10	ICLA: Legal Assistance	Danida

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[11] Small field offices of partners, limited senior staff with local authorities.

[12] Efforts to capture outcomes are also made by NRC in (as yet very rudimentary) M and E reports being introduced in e.g Aweil.

SDFK 1102, SDFM 1102 Warrap	6.5 MSEK	1Jan,11-31Dec,11	EFSD: Improving livelihoods.	Sida
SDFS 1102 Warrap	2.0 NOK	1March - 31Dec,11	SHELTER: Emergency Shelter	NMFA
SDFL 1004	0.2 MUSD	1Jan-31Dec,11	ICLA: Legal Aid	UNHCR
SDFM1101	13.0 MNOK	1Jan-31Dec,11	ICLA-EFSD	NMFA
SDFS 1202 NBeG and Warrap	3.5 MNOK	1Jan-31Dec,10–31Dec,12	SHELTER: Emergency Shelter	NMFA (HAPPDA)
SDFS 1001 NBeG	12.2 NOK	1April,10 - 30Sept,11	SHELTER: School Construction.	NMFA
SDFT1101 NBeG	6.5 MSEK	1Jan-31Dec,11	EDUCATION: Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP)	Sida
SDFL 1202	6.0 MNOK	1Jan - 31Dec,12	ICLA: Durable solutions.	NMFA (HAPPDA)
SDFK 1201 NBeG	6.5 MNOK	1Jan-31Dec,12	Livelihoods	NMFA
SDFK1202 Warrap	8.0 MSEK	1Jan-31Dec,12	EFSD: Improving Livelihoods	Sida
SDFK 1203	1.0 MDKK	1Jan-31Dec,12	EFSD: Improving Livelihoods	Danida
SDFL 1201 NBeG	6.5 MDKK	1Jan-31Dec,12	ICLA: Legal Assistance	Danida
SDFL 1202	6.0 MNOK	1Jan-31Dec,12	ICLA: Durable Solutions	NMFA
SDFM1202	14.0 MNOK	1Jan-31Dec,12	ICLA-EFSD	Sida
SDFT1201 NBeG	6.0 MSEK	1Jan-31Dec,12	EDUCATION: ALP	Sida
SDFM1201 NBeG	7.5 MDKK	1Jan-31Dec,12	ICLA: Legal Assistance and Livelihoods	Danida
SDFS 1201 Warrap	13.0 MNOK	1Jan,12 – 30June,13	SHELTER: School Construction and Life Skills	NMFA

Figure 3: NRC projects in South Sudan 2010 – 2012.

Projects to be visited were selected among these, based on a combination of core competency coverage, security concerns, logistics and implementation phase. The selection criteria were as follows:

- Projects that were possible to visit, given the security, time and logistical limitations.
- Projects that had been implemented since South Sudan became a separate Country office, i.e. since mid-2011.
- PETS project to be either EFSD or Shelter, Education projects excluded, as per Terms of Reference.

The team visited projects located in the areas around Alek and Aweil and interviewed staff about the overall country operation in Juba, Alek and Aweil.

2.6 Organisation of the field visit

Prior to embarking on the evaluation exercise in the three case countries, the field team convened in Nairobi (22 - 26 September) to work out practicalities e.g. re-constituting country evaluation teams (after Abdishakur, Lead consultant for Somalia and International consultant

for South Sudan pulled out to attend to his sick father), harmonising evaluation tools, updating the case country work plans and their respective logistics.

All team members visited the Country Office in Juba and the operations in Aweil. One part of the evaluation team visited Alek in the Warrap State where NRC has implemented ICLA, EFSD and Shelter/WASH projects since 2011. It should be noted that, from the documents available and interviews conducted, it is evident that NRC's core activities in Warrap did not start until mid-2011 when the field coordination office in Alek was established. Most of the key staff was recruited between July 2011 and January 2012, which implies that measurement of target activity results would be based on an implementation period of less than 12 months. The evaluation team also visited NBeG, where the public expenditure tracking survey was conducted along with interviews focused on ICLA and management. The persons interviewed at the different locations are listed in Annex 1.

To the extent possible the evaluation team used a participatory approach by involving representatives of stakeholders including beneficiaries, staff, partners (primarily UN) and local authorities. Composition of the team and team work, document review, use of key informant interviews (individual and group) and attention to attribution and un-intended results characterised the implementation of the field visit.

Stakeholders in the evaluation from whom respondents were derived include the donor community, INGOs, Government officials at national, state and payam levels[13], NRC staff at country, state and field coordination levels, beneficiaries and leaders representing them. Three transit sites with either IDPs or returnees and host community representing at least one relevant NRC core activity were selected for each focus group discussion across the project area in Alek.

Prior to the actual field visit, a series of correspondence, consultations and meetings were held to design the framework and tools and to review work plans with key participants. Meetings were held in Stockholm with the technical experts of the overall evaluation team, in Nairobi with field team consultants, at country coordination level with NRC on work plans and logistics and with NRC coordination staff in the field locations visited for appointments and logistical support. The table below shows the details of the evaluation field work:

Field Work Itinerary, South Sudan		
Where	**When**	**Who**
Regional Office Nairobi	Sept 25th	Charles Byamugisha and Björn Ternström
Country Office Juba	Oct 3 - 4th Oct 7th	Charles Byamugisha and Leben Moro Björn Ternström and Japhet Makongo
Aweil	Oct 5 – 7th	Charles Byamugisha and Leben Moro
Aweil	Oct 7 – 12th	Björn Ternström and Japhet Makongo
Alek/Warrap	Oct 9 - 12th	Charles Byamugisha and Leben Moro
Juba	Oct 12th	Feedback session management team, Björn Ternström
Juba	Oct 13th	Full team
Juba	Oct 16-22nd	Follow up interviews, Leben Moro
Juba	Oct 22nd	Feedback session with Country Director, Leben Moro

Figure 4: Field work itinerary.

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[13] Payam: district level of government administration

2.7 Limitations

The insecure situation in parts of South Sudan affected the selection of areas and projects that were visited, the extent of direct observation that could be made, the way interviews were conducted and the amount of information that could be collected from the target population.

During the inception phase of the evaluation, a security meeting was arranged with NRC, Norad and the evaluation team leader to discuss logistics and planning of the field work. It was agreed that for security reasons the team should spend as little time as possible in the field; that NRC should recommend and have the final say in the areas and projects to visit; that detailed field visit plans should be shared with as few individuals and organisations as possible; and that NRC should arrange local transport, security and help in preparations for interviews.

The organisation being evaluated has thus been involved in designing the field work to a larger extent than would be the case in an evaluation in an area where an evaluation team can move and interact with people freely.

The logistics of South Sudan were an added complication which, when combined with limited field time, restricted access for the team. Much time was spent travelling due to long distances and poor roads, such as those between Alek NRC field office and project areas. To other areas, roads were inaccessible. Both private and UN flight services fly to and from Aweil and Alek on specific days only, this limited our ability and flexibility to plan for more interviews.

Poor communication network i.e. internet and telephone limitations also constrained work, as did the limited amount of time allocated for the evaluation.

Selection of key informants in field locations was relatively simple as these are small offices with limited staff (true for both local authorities and partner organisations). However, the NRC Alek office asked the evaluation team to reconsider holding interviews with certain authorities due to bad relations at that point in time. Out of respect for feared negative impact on operations, the team went along with this request.[14] Similarly, the chief in Lukluk village refused to meet the evaluation team, reportedly because he did not want to see NGOs operating in Warrap.

Availability of documentation was affected by the fact that until July 2011, NRC's current programmes in South Sudan were part of the Sudan programme. As a result, specific programme documentation on South Sudan for the period under review (2010-2012) was limited. We had access to summarised consolidated country core activity reports (quarterly) but very few progress reports for individual projects. This made it difficult to segregate data for analysis and statistical presentation. Furthermore, the team had very little time to study project documentation before commencing field work.

The Terms of Reference instruct the team to interview NORCAP personnel on assignments in case countries wherever relevant. During the field visit, we conducted interviews with NORCAP secondees when and where it was possible. NORCAP data will be presented in the main evaluation report.

The evaluation includes a public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) of one project in South Sudan. The findings of the PETS will be presented in a joint report for the three case countries. The joint report will include a description of PETS specific methodology.

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[14] This is further commented on in the section on corruption below.

2.8 Reliability and Validity

The way this field visit was implemented affects reliability and validity of the results of the evaluation. Neither country nor projects or areas were selected randomly, hence results cannot be generalised to other activities, areas or countries. Similarly, the involvement of NRC in the selection of projects and location is a potential cause for bias in the selection of projects, and hence evaluation results. In the dialogue concerning selection of project areas to visit we have asked for motivations regarding proposals. We have found them to be balanced between evaluation team criteria[15] and logistical/security realities.

The selection of beneficiaries to interview has not been directly affected by NRC. However access to beneficiaries has been limited by logistics, security and surprise holidays (not even the Headmasters of the schools we visited knew of the holiday in advance, hence although the Headmaster was there, there were no pupils in the school on the day of the visit).

3 Findings on Activities

South Sudan is a challenging environment in which to organise activities. Security is tenuous, logistics are difficult, infrastructure rudimentary at best, institutions evolving and there are technical capacity gaps in most fields. For NRC, such challenges have been compounded by the history of its presence in the country, influenced by the organisation's rapid and involuntary departure from Sudan. When considering our findings on core competencies below and the organisation's progress this needs to be taken into account. The organisation has, during the evaluation period, been successful in attracting funding and has significantly expanded activities. Below we first present findings related to management and support systems, then discuss core competencies and finally present overall findings regarding relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

3.1 Management and Support Systems

NRC globally has well established systems and structures. There are policies in relevant areas, practical guidelines, a culture of investment in staff training as well as checks and balances in management procedures.[16] In South Sudan these systems and structures have been challenged in a number of ways. Support systems have not kept up with the expansion of activities and this has impacted both on the organisation and its activities.[17] The evaluation team is aware that serious efforts to rectify the situation are underway. However, these had not yet resolved the situation at the time of the field visits.

Management Finding 1: Gaps in leadership have seriously affected NRC South Sudan operations

As mentioned above the significant expansion of activities in recent years has led to serious strain on support systems as exemplified in the following sections. Such strain has been allowed to continue to a point where it is affecting activities, the ability of staff to conduct their duties and ultimately the organisation's reputation. NRC leadership at head office and country levels have failed to identify and/or address the magnitude of the problems. Until spring 2012, NRC Oslo had not adequately reacted to the serious underperformance of support systems in South Sudan.

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[15] Criteria varied between evaluation tasks e.g. PETS required relative stability to conduct, a project site with more than one core competency represented was given priority, a mix of activities completed in past six months and ongoing was sought.

[16] See e.g. the Financial Handbook.

[17] See e.g. the Country Strategy South Sudan 2012 – 2014.

Lately, due to several interacting circumstances, country leadership has changed several times. Since August 2012, a new Country Director is in place, the third to hold that position this year.

Staff members attested to a climate where increasing the volume of funding has been more important than quality of programming. Results achievements in quantitative terms and volume expansion have been perceived as the focus of organisational leaders. Despite the obvious difficulties the Country Office is going through, the head office recently sent a rapid assessment team to conduct a feasibility study on whether to start up significant new activities in Northeastern South Sudan. We were informed that the study recommended going ahead with such an expansion, albeit with the caveat that it should not further burden the country office, indicating a continued focus on expansion despite current difficulties.

Management Finding 2: Roles and responsibilities within the management system are not clear

Several key informants interviewed attested to confusion among staff regarding who is responsible for what. They also stated that there is a tendency for projects to become vertical silos with little attention to inter-programme coherence. This does not promote coherence between programmes and risks the occurrence of inter-programme/project contradictions and/or overlap, compromising efficiency. Although thematic working relationships are said to be good, programme linkages remain largely vertical, autonomous and are geographically isolated. Roles that appeared unclear included Area Manager, Programme Manager and Project Coordinator. Staff perceived lack of clarity between these roles and also cited a tendency for area managers to become highly autonomous – to the point of establishing "fiefdoms".

While recognising that policies, handbooks and guidelines covered most professional areas, staff also describe a culture where non-compliance with existing policies does not lead to either consequences for staff or change of policy. Some interviewees described key managers as uninterested or lacking appropriate background to deal with operational and support issues.

The NRC staff interviewed in Alek emphasised the challenges caused by the WASH project being added onto the existing Shelter programme without a thorough feasibility assessment. Both programmes are coordinated by the WASH Project Coordinator and yet Shelter local staff receives direct instructions from the Shelter Programme Manager based in Aweil. This has caused confusion regarding reporting lines among programme staff in Alek.

Other staff noted that "Everybody does everything" which compromises a sense of individual responsibility.

Management Finding 3: Financial support structures are not performing adequately

The allocation of Oslo-based surge capacity in support of the financial support structures in South Sudan is an indication that the head office recognises the problems the country office is encountering in this area. Indications that there is a serious problem include the repeatedly late reconciliation of accounts. There have also been serious financial management errors in relation to a major donor necessitating repayment of USD 950 000. Original mistakes were compounded several times during the handling of the process, resulting in serious damage to a key donor relationship. A representative of the donor stated that "of our approximately 40 implementing partners in South Sudan NRC has been our biggest headache in 2012".

Several staff members mentioned that there were problems with the financial systems. In many cases the volume of activities combined with a need for further on-the-job training of staff were identified as the main causes of the problems.

The former Controller for the South Sudan operation was relatively junior, resulting in inadequate supervision from Oslo (please note that we see this as a systemic lapse in the appointment, not a lack of professionalism or commitment on the individual's part).

Management Finding 4: Procurement structures are not performing adequately

Key informants said that there were serious delays in delivery of materials, causing a negative impact on activities. Examples cited ranged from training materials not delivered eight months after request (six months after the trainings), computers taking six months to procure and seeds for distribution delivered after planting season. Delays are also referred to in project documentation such as quarterly reports.

We were confronted with multiple staff complaints about the procurement function and the procurement staff themselves stated that they are being overwhelmed.

Management Finding 5: Logistics structures are not performing adequately

There were multiple staff complaints about the logistics function. Concrete examples mostly referred to lack of maintenance or proper organisation, for example, five of eight computers in Aweil were cited as in-operable due to lack of maintenance, and systems for allocation of vehicles between projects were described as inefficient and lacking prioritisation.

Similarly, supervisors expressed frustration that follow-up activities were not being implemented as field staff were spending time in offices instead of the field due to lack of transport, caused by inadequate maintenance leading to non-functioning vehicles.

Management Finding 6: Human resource structures are not performing adequately

There were multiple examples of positions vacant for extended periods of time, causing delays in programming and undue stress for the rest of the organisation. Staff were leaving prior to the end of their contracts for reasons related to health, stress, mismatch of job with competencies, mismatch of job as presented pre-appointment with job reality. Staff taking over positions were not arriving in time to have an overlap period with their predecessor, causing loss of institutional memory and impacting relations with external stakeholders. For example the relocation of the Alek office (June, 2011) and recruitment of key staff took a long time: the EFSD Programme Manager was not recruited until January, 2012, i.e. six months after the programme implementation had started.[18]

Document review and interviews with staff showed that there was no formal induction for the new staff. Examples were given where newly recruited staff had started work without getting any induction.

The need for additional capacity-building of national staff was repeatedly cited by both supervisors and employees. The difficulties of finding competent staff were accentuated by explicit demands from local authorities that an increasing share of employees be recruited locally.

According to the budget, NRC allocates South Sudanese Pounds 700 (approx. USD 230) for each staff to utilise for individual trainings relevant to their job for self-capacity building. Staff capacity building was based on identification of needs in connection with performance appraisals. Such appraisals (in principle) take place annually. Interviewees noted that this was not always the case and that, even when performance appraisals identified gaps, such identification could take place up to 12 months after staff members commenced execution of their duties.

The Human Resources officer was described as overwhelmed.

We recognise that getting competent and experienced staff to manage programmes is a challenge in South Sudan. Naturally, salaries are a component of the decision for people whether or not to join an organisation. NRC has conducted a salary comparison survey in Juba to see if the salaries being offered are reasonable. The findings of the survey show that NRC is a competitive employer in terms of the levels of salaries being paid.[19]

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[18] Source: Interviews with staff
[19] Source: Interviews with staff

Management Finding 7: Monitoring and evaluation activities were inadequate

The monitoring and evaluation function exists but is still rudimentary as acknowledged by most staff interviewed. Limited emphasis on results-based planning and limited investment in relevant monitoring and evaluation skills development have affected measurement of programme results.

There was a lack of capacity to generate relevant data to measure results. Staff interviewed said that "despite indicators in the logframe, measuring results has been challenging". Examples given include a lack of qualitative WASH indicators as well as relevant tools and the ability to translate indicators into action.

Project line staff noted that they spend more time on paper work at the office and less time conducting monitoring field visits due to limited transport facilities.

Management Finding 8: NRC was aware of the management issues and investing to correct them

In response to the multilayered problems described above, NRC in the summer of 2012, decided to invest in "surge capacity". This involved NRC sending technical support (57 expatriate person months), to support the South Sudan operation in Information Technology (IT), asset management and warehousing, logistics, finance, administration, human resources and grants management as well as tailored support (12 weeks) to overall management.

Follow-up interviews indicate that support systems are gradually improving in response to this investment.

3.2 Shelter

The team made the following observations regarding shelter activities:

Shelter Finding 1: NRC shelter activities were in line with beneficiaries' needs

The Shelter project funded by NMFA (SDFS1201) started as a pilot emergency response to the Abyei crisis of May/June 2011. According to the NRC HAPPDA 2011 Annual Progress report, NRC planned to provide beneficiaries with locally procured shelter materials i.e. grass mats, locally woven twining and wooden poles in order to address existing gaps in 2012. Beneficiaries at Majak Aheer (Warrap State) attest to having received shelter kits composed of items including plastic sheets and wooden poles. Key among remaining shelter needs confirmed by the beneficiaries were assistance for locally made materials to complete the tukuls they currently occupy, clinics, and schools for the children in liaison with the government to provide permanent settlement.

Shelter Finding 2: The shelter programme in Warrap state is achieving its intended results

According to the NRC HAPPDA 2011 Annual Report, out of the 1,500 returnee and IDP households targeted for emergency shelter in Twic and Gogrial West counties, Warrap state, 1,450 (97%) received the kits. In addition, 4 temporary classrooms and 2 out-patient nutritional rooms were constructed at Mayen Abun transit site. The Shelter objectives were to offset the environmental impact of deforestation, promote a high percentage of shelter kit utilisation in all distribution locations, and a significant improvement in living conditions.

Interviews with beneficiaries suggest that they recognise the positive impact of NRC's assistance such as protection and improved livelihood through NFIs. Shelter materials were cited as providing protection from the rain and heat (and to some extent malaria). While plastic sheets were suitable for this emergency response, shelter materials adapted to local environment would have been preferred.

Shelter Finding 3: There are unsolved issues relating to land and natural resources

Beneficiaries reported that uncertainty still surrounded their security of tenure with regard to land acquisition for increased farming and construction of permanent shelter. In this context, some beneficiaries at the Turaler Pajam transit site expressed appreciation for training and support on land issues given through the ICLA programme.

Due to high competition over resources in Majok Aheer, for example, land for cattle grazing and water pumps, the relationship between returnees and host communities was not good. This concern was raised during focus group discussions with the evaluation team.

Shelter Finding 4: The school construction project in Aweil has achieved its planned outputs

The shelter project SDFS1001 includes school construction and education. The construction component was the subject for the PETS in South Sudan, the education component was not included in this evaluation.[20] The overall objective of the school construction project, implemented in Aweil in NBeG (SDFS1001), was to improve children's overall rights to education and protection through improved access to quality basic education for out-of-school children, with a particular focus on high return areas. The objective relating to school construction was to provide beneficiaries with appropriate learning environment by construction of school infrastructure and training facilities in close cooperation with the authorities, communities and other NRC core activities. The initial proposal has a total budget of NOK 12 million.[21]

The PETS finds that the school construction component under project SDFS1001 has been successfully implemented with all deliverables achieved, as outlined in the project document. The beneficiaries (teachers, pupils, community members and PTAs[22]) are satisfied with the delivery of the project outputs. Four primary schools, each with 8 classrooms, pit latrines, kitchen, storage room and a water point) were constructed and all are in operation in Maper-East, Maper-West, Tiaraliet and Warahel primary schools. The opinion of stakeholders is that the school infrastructure is of good quality and meets the needs of the beneficiaries (pupils and teachers). *(Source: Interviews, quarterly reports 2010 and 2011, annual report 2010).*

Shelter Finding 5: The school construction project is not fully adapted to local conditions

The school construction project had a standard package of deliverables/outputs in each school (8 classrooms, toilets for boys and girls, kitchen, storage and training of youth) regardless of the location and population of children in the respective areas. This has led to establishing an infrastructure which is underutilised in some areas like Warahel, with only 217 pupils, while in Maper-East classrooms were overcrowded (accentuated by increased attraction of improved schools). During field visits the evaluation team observed a relatively good quality of work done at field level, and beneficiaries interviewed (parents, pupils and PTAs) all expressed satisfaction with the construction work. However, kitchen design is not adapted to cooking with firewood. The kitchen floors are likely to break because of the heat when cooking with fire-wood directly on the floor, the health of the cooks is at risk because of poor ventilation and hygienic treatment of the food is not guaranteed.

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[20] For further details see the Public Expenditure Tracking Survey report.

[21] See NRC 2009, SDFS1001 Project proposal NMFA.

[22] Parent teacher association.

Figure 5: Kitchen/Storage and Cooking stove on the floor in Warahel Primary school. Photo: J. Makongo

Shelter Finding 6: Community contributions are considered crucial but are not visible in the budget

According to NRC staff, participation and contribution made by local communities are considered to be key elements of efficient utilisation of NRC's external resource support. Community and beneficiary participation (teachers, parents through the PTA representatives and local leaders) has been well applied as a means to sensitise people, drawing common agreement and decisions on selection of construction site location, safety of construction materials and nomination of potential youth trainees.

In the construction of the school, beneficiaries were asked to mobilise their labour in the collection of locally available building materials such as sand, stone, water and bricks. Whereas the contribution of NRC is clearly indicated in monetary terms (i.e. for SDFS1001, NOK 12 million actual financial contribution in the budget for materials, expertise, transport etc.), the community contribution has not been factored in the same way in the budget summary. It was therefore not possible to make a comparison of the partner's contribution (in percentage terms) to the project.

3.3 WASH

NRC has integrated WASH into the Shelter programme (Warrap project currently coordinated from Aweil by a WASH Programme Manager) as a gradual process to develop it into a fully fledged, stand alone programme. However, in Warrap state, a WASH project coordinator was not recruited until February 2012 although the project was designed to end in June 2012. In consequence, the project period was extended to December 2012.

WASH Finding 1: The WASH programme was based on a number of faulty assumptions

According to NRC staff, NRC is implementing WASH recovery activities in terms of rehabilitation of broken boreholes and training of beneficiaries and host communities as long term approaches to sustainable sanitation.

The evaluation team found that the WASH programming methodology was not adapted to local conditions: Local flooding patterns were not considered, leading to flooding and failure of constructions; there were errors in the budget for borehole rehabilitation[23]; and the selected methodology for WASH was not based on local conditions. According to staff

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[23] Inclusion of non-existing boreholes and boreholes that had existed 12 months.

interviewed, latrines are not perceived as priority in the area by the local people. Unlike the situation in urban areas, people in rural settings often prefer using the bush as latrines. Interviews with staff indicate that there was an assumption that an NRC supplied model for WASH latrines called Community Led Total Sanitation "CLTS", which is widely used in South East Asia, could be applied in Warrap state. This has proved not to be the case. The faulty assumptions regarding the importance and usefulness of latrines were attributed to lack of involvement of local WASH experts in initial needs assessments and programme design.[24]

WASH Finding 2: WASH programme results were not met due to a combination of factors

Failure to achieve WASH programme objectives were due mainly to the late recruitment of the Project Officer in Alek, (recruited in February for a project ending in May), inappropriate design (choice of latrine-building as intervention) and inadequate assessment (budgeting for rehabilitation of non-existent boreholes[25], inadequate knowledge of flooding patterns).

3.4 Emergency Food Security and Distribution (EFSD)

The team looked at EFSD projects in Warrap State, focussing on the Sida funded projects SDFK1102 and SDFK1107 in Alek. With support from the Sida framework agreement, NRC has been implementing NFI distributions and Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) activities in Warrap State since January 2011, specifically in Twic and Gogrial West Counties. NRC's strategic set up in combination with Sida funding enabled the organisation to set up an Emergency and Preparedness Response (EPR) team with pre-positioned NFI stock in NBeG and Warrap States. Thus, NRC was able to be a major frontline actor in time of crisis, responding to the massive influx of populations into both states, especially during the referendum period (returnees) and the Abyei crisis (IDPs) in May/June 2011. This also shows commendable complementarity with other sources of funding (NRC Annual Plan Jan-Dec 2012, Sida Framework Agreement, p 117.) Below, we present findings relating to the two projects SDFK1107 and SDFK1102.

EFSD Finding 1: In SDFK1107, output targets were reported as achieved to a large extent. However, in the NFI project, reported output achievements did not fully support this.

The overall objective of SDFK1107 was "To promote and protect the right to non–food item assistance of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees in Northern Bahr e Ghazal and Warrap States" (including beneficiaries in Twic and Gogrial West Counties of Warrap State). The specific outcome objective was "To fulfil the immediate NFI needs of targeted groups". The output targets of project SDFK1107 were to procure 4000 NFI kits and to distribute them to 4000 households. The annual progress report for 2011 states that the output objective was achieved to 90%. It also stated that 3993 NFI kits were procured and 660 distributed. Thus, close to 100% were procured but only 16% distributed. In comments, it was stated that the distribution was on-going. The remainder of the NFI kits were prepositioned for distribution in anticipation of future needs.[26]

An emergency and preparedness response team (EPR) was deployed in the NFI distribution of pre-positioned stocks and responded to the May/June 2011 Abyei emergency crisis.

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[24] In comments to the draft report, NRC notes that the donor proposed and insisted on the CLTS model.
[25] Source: Interview with staff (untriangulated and we lack data on locations).
[26] See Annual progress report 2011 to Sida

3.4.1 Food security and livelihoods

EFSD in South Sudan is comprised mainly of Food Security and Livelihood (FSL) activities in NBeG and Warrap. The activities were initiated in 2011 and include providing returnees, IDPs and host communities with:

- Agricultural inputs
- Training in agricultural practices for vegetable and cereal crops
- Training in livelihoods and income generating activities
- Awareness raising: in diet diversity, food hygiene and tree planting (in order to limit environmental degradation)

Components of the projects are varied, ranging from irrigated vegetable crop production in the dry season, rain-fed cereal crop production in the rainy season, bee-keeping and fishing and farmer field schools. The different components aim at coherence and complementarity, e.g. combining enhancement of agricultural rural production with training in new techniques and environmental awareness-raising.

Project activities are designed for a mix of targets groups including vulnerable individuals, farmers groups, schools and local authorities. The intention is to benefit returnees/IDPs and host communities. The target was to use 25% for the benefit of host communities, but according to the evaluation of the food security programme (Herd et. al. 2012), only 11% of the actual distributions went to that group.[27]

NRC has provided agro-inputs, trainings in agricultural practices, crop irrigation and diet diversification, fisheries together with distribution of inputs targeting up to 2000 households per output, with the targeted results achievement set to 75%.

The intervention logic for SDFK1102 states that the overall objective of the project was "To improve food security and livelihoods for vulnerable and conflict affected households in Warrap State". The outcome objectives of the project were; i) to increase household food availability and accessibility through agricultural production and ii) to support livelihoods and abilities of households to generate income. The project's indicators for outcome objectives were as follows: out of the targeted households, 75% report increased harvests, 75% have increased their diet diversification score, 75% report increased income and 75% have decreased their negative coping strategies. (Source: NRC Annual Progress Report, 2011).

EFSD Finding 2: The food security programme was relevant to beneficiaries but not all inputs were fully in line with their priorities

Interviewed NRC staff said that the food security project was relevant to beneficiaries. This was confirmed during interviews with the OCHA office in Kuajok.[28] However, according to beneficiaries, there was poor selection of seeds such as sorghum that was not adaptable to local climatic conditions. Furthermore, their means to improve livelihoods have also been constrained by other factors, such as in agriculture where they have been constrained by small sized plots allocated per household.[29]

EFSD Finding 3: The EFSD programme is likely to have contributed to a sustainable increase in income opportunities but there is little systematic data to assess this

The EFSD programme may well have resulted in positive and sustainable change, but there is little systematic data to support this. One of the NRC staff commented that "...in the absence of credible data, it can be subjectively suggested that there was positive change from the EFSD programme intervention".

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[27] Herd et.al, 2012, Evaluation of Food Security Programme 2010-2012 South Sudan, DRAFT version dated 2012-12-06

[28] Attempts to further triangulate with Warrap local authorities failed, see limitations section.

[29] Focus group discussion at Mayan Gumel in Warrap state.

Some beneficiaries who participated in trainings have taken up income-generating activities. Interviews with NRC staff, later confirmed by beneficiaries, indicated increased farmer group sizes and the uptake of new activities, for example black-smiths and hair dressing, suggesting there is improved self-reliance.

EFSD Finding 4: There are inconsistencies as to the timeliness of achievements

The South Sudan quarterly report for the second quarter of 2011 (i.e. April to June 2011) states that the distribution of agricultural inputs was timely for several projects, including SDFK1102. Staff sources, requesting not to be identified, claimed that the late distribution of agricultural seeds to beneficiaries, i.e. in July as opposed to April 2011, resulted in poor yields. Similarly sources claim that the project started six months late, in June 2011, which led to a rush in implementation. Essential steps in the project design process were not carried out, notably a needs assessment. Furthermore, the team has not been able to find any contextual analysis good enough to identify realistic assumptions enabling a comparison with results. A baseline survey, said to have informed planning, was reportedly carried out in July 2011.[30] The report was not available to the team, and on the basis of the second quarterly report, it would appear that it must have been carried out after the distribution of agricultural inputs.

Implementation seems to have been guided by the planned project timeline as opposed to whether beneficiaries could continue with the activities on their own or not. Consistent with the EFSD policy, NRC Alek planned for a short-term intervention to address immediate emergency needs and hence, results targets were expressed as short term indicators, mainly focusing on output. However, as this was a food security, rather than food distribution, project, such short-term focus decreases the chances of successful achievement of objectives.

EFSD Finding 5: The EFSD programme in Alek was overly ambitious

Staff interviewed attributed this to the large geographical coverage and large beneficiary caseload, which increased from 2000 to 4000 households within one year.[31] Projects started late and limited logistical, administrative and human resource capacity hampered implementation. The planning process was rushed and lacked a systematic approach.

Programme implementation was also hampered by high staff turnover and slow recruitment of key staff members. This is largely attributed to resentment by local population for employees from outside Warrap state, environmental living hardships and acute lack of skilled manpower in the state. (Most staff confirmed this).

EFSD Finding 6: Overall programme relevance was compromised by weak planning and implementation

The evaluation team encountered anecdotal evidence that the programme, while relevant at the macro level, had its effectiveness reduced by weak implementation. The recent evaluation of the food security programme confirmed this:[32]

"Regarding the FSL [food, security and livelihoods] intervention areas of CCP [cereal crop production], VCP [vegetable crop production], livelihood training and fishing, the evaluation generally found all areas to be relevant to the existing livelihood and food security needs and priorities of the BNF [beneficiaries]."[33]

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[30] The team was informed that the baseline survey report was still in draft form and a copy was not available.

[31] At the time of the evaluation NRC emphasised that they had identified the need for improved geographical focus.

[32] Herd et. el., 2012, Evaluation of Food Security Programme 2010-2012 South Sudan, DRAFT version dated 2012-12-06.

[33] Herd et. al. 2012, p.15.

Demand from beneficiaries for continued similar support confirms beneficiaries' overall appreciation. However, the food security evaluation also finds the intervention to be built on low quality baseline studies, limited consultation with the beneficiaries, poorly made assumptions about the situation and little local knowledge. Furthermore, there is no evidence that monitoring data generated has led to learning.[34]

The quality of targeting is core to programme effectiveness. Problems with gaps between principle and practice and inconsistent quality were found in this area as well: the food security evaluation found that the beneficiary selection criteria were "... appropriate in theory, yet were found to be inadequately defined, designed, applied, monitored and recorded in practice...".[35]

3.5 ICLA

The ICLA programme is NRC's oldest in South Sudan and was established in 2004. It is mainly implemented in three States: Central Equatoria, NBeG and Warrap. The ICLA programmes in Yei, Aweil and Alek started in 2007, 2010 and 2011 respectively. Main donors are NMFA, Danida, DFAIT[36] Canada and UNHCR.

At the time of the field visit the programme was run by one international programme manager, three international project coordinators and over 50 national programme staff. The programme has recently expanded activities to Warrap. Housing, land and property (HLP) issues are the main focus of the programme and in South Sudan NRC plays a lead role in this area. Activities include: training, information, legal counselling, dispute resolution, coordination and technical support to stakeholders involved.[37]

The team visited ICLA project SDFL1102 in Alek and interviewed ICLA staff and stakeholders in Aweil.

The overall objective of project SDFL1102 for 2011 is to increase the access of Sudanese IDPs and returnees to information and justice fundamental to assist them in achieving durable solutions. The project's stated outcome objectives are to a) increase beneficiary (IDPs, returnees and host community) access to formal and informal justice systems, knowledge of reintegration services and national protection mechanisms and capacity to access them and, b) carry out effective and targeted advocacy in relation to rights-based issues.[38]

In NBeG the project ran ten ICLA clinics, geographically focussing on areas with high numbers of returnees. Clinics were relocated according to need. The process included initial opening of temporary clinics to assess demand. The clinics were complemented with trainings on land and returnee related issues to beneficiaries and local authorities. Stakeholders indicated that such trainings lessened tensions concerning land issues in areas where they had been held.

ICLA Finding 1: The ICLA programme in South Sudan is relevant

NRC staff stated their belief that the ICLA programme was relevant. This was confirmed by beneficiaries interviewed. In Alek, beneficiaries considered ICLA activities as relevant to their needs due to changing contextual factors, such as a) the high influx of returnees, b) urbanisation, as people wanted to live in cities when peace returned and then required

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[34] Ibid, pp. 16 -17.

[35] Ibid p. 22.

[36] Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada.

[37] See e.g. NRC, 2012, ICLA Adviser Visit to South Sudan Report, 20 – 29 May 2012, for the overview of the program.

[38] Source: Project logical framework.

proper documentation for land acquisition, c) increased land disputes due to urbanisation, and d) need to address a long history of cultural imbalances in society for example property ownership by women and other marginalised groups. It was against this backdrop that NRC started special ICLA units of Land and Property, Training and Counselling. The programme was designed in dialogue with the government's Land Commission and Physical Infrastructure Department. NRC was cited as having a significant role in the process of drafting the Land Law, as well as in its dissemination at various levels of government.

NRC maintains preparedness in case of tension among returnees, IDPs and the host communities. ICLA activity centres are placed close to target beneficiaries with staff deployed for example at Majak Aheer transit site. Tools for land and property registration have been designed.

NRC is the only agency implementing ICLA in the Warrap state and its role has been significant. Interviews with both beneficiaries and OCHA identified the likelihood of a series of negative consequences should NRC not operate in the area. They included: a) Escalation of land conflicts between beneficiaries and host communities, leading to chaos, b) worsening of family disputes, c) increased violation of human (children/women) rights, d) dominance in land acquisition by the well-to do, e) forced/early marriages, f) increase of corruption cases by local authorities, g) integration of returnees/IDPs and host communities would be very difficult.

ICLA Finding 2: The ICLA programme in Alek is timely and effective in that it meets the needs of its beneficiaries

From the interviews conducted with NRC staff, beneficiaries and UN, it can be deduced that ICLA is one of the most effective programmes implemented by NRC in Warrap state. This is evidenced by not only the operational structures with personnel at field level but also the high level of acknowledgement by the beneficiaries of the results, which included; formation of committees through which they have claimed their land or property rights and compensation in courts of law, obtained legal land documentation, re-integration with host communities and treatment of disabilities that have in turn improved school attendance for children. Stakeholders also indicated that trainings on land and returnee related issues to beneficiaries and local authorities had lessened tensions concerning land issues in areas where they had been held.

Beneficiaries have become better at claiming their rights in courts of law and have received their title deeds. This was substantiated by staff and was consistent with beneficiaries' views that through the ICLA training programme, disabled people have been assisted through testing and treatment of, for example, orthopaedic appliances in collaboration with ICRC[39] in Juba. This has in turn enabled disabled children to attend schools regularly. ICLA support has also enabled beneficiaries to claim rights such as compensation from construction for destroyed property. The timing of the programme coincided with the evolving humanitarian needs.

According to project documents, objectives were largely achieved due to timely implementation and adequate staff capacity. The 2011 annual progress report (logframe for SDFL1102) states that "the strong result reflects effective targeting of beneficiaries and ICLA's provision of services in areas not covered by other organisations."

ICLA Finding 3: The ICLA programme contributes to connectedness – at a cost

NRC is lead agency for ICLA in collaboration with UNHCR. NRC shares referral systems with other partners like ICRC and UNHCR with whom they share information, generate consensus and work together in coordination with local authorities and community based organisations.

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[39] International Committee of the Red Cross.

The ICLA programme also has multiple points of interaction with other NRC activities (advocacy, protection, livelihoods, shelter etc.). For example, support to the drafting of the Land Law was described as an ICLA activity, yet outreach activities were approached by beneficiaries with a broad range of issues commonly not related to ICLA. This was interpreted both as a sign of trust, an indication of the lack of other entry points to assistance - and as a challenge given NRC's core task. In order to streamline activities staff referred clients to the appropriate service providers. In some cases this was other departments in NRC, in other cases local authorities or UN agencies.

Staff attested to a high pressure environment, in part due to responsibilities beyond their job descriptions such as cluster commitments and not-immediately-ICLA-relevant client visits. The ICLA advisor's report also indicates a need to prioritise in the client load to achieve greater effect.

ICLA Finding 4: There are complaints mechanisms in the ICLA projects

Mechanisms to share information and air complaints between NRC and beneficiaries exist in the ICLA projects. This was expressed by staff and confirmed by beneficiaries in interviews. Through training programs, beneficiaries have the opportunity to openly comment on ICLA services. Results on beneficiary satisfaction are measured as increases in the rate of solving land disputes and improvement in co-existence between host communities and returnees. Un-intended results included identification and support for separated and un-accompanied minors who do not fall under NRC's mandate.

ICLA Finding 5: NRC is investing in staff capacity building

Under the programme NRC has conducted several relevant trainings for its staff, including Management and Development, Report Writing, Protection, Nationality Law, Human Resources and Administration, International Displacement and Monitoring/IDP Protection, two Training of Trainers for ICLA and compilation of a Manual for Community Based Protection.

ICLA Finding 6: Junior staff lack an understanding of cost drivers

Interviews with both junior and senior staff indicated that the non-senior management staff did not seem to understand what drives costs. This was based on recognition by senior staff and confirmation from junior staff interviewed that management of budgets is for the senior staff only while improvement to sensitise junior staff is underway.

ICLA Finding 7: The programme adapts creatively to contextual challenges

Several examples of creative adaptation to context can be found in the ICLA programme.

- By setting up mobile teams to start up activities and assess needs, NRC could gauge the relevance of a new activity/location by measuring the level of demand among the migrant population at this location.
- Stakeholders were proactively approached with training on the new Land Law and local authorities stated that they requested NRC to hold such trainings in areas where they perceived land related tensions were rising – and that such training lessened tension.
- When confronted with traditional leaders refusing to consider land rights for women, users' rights were negotiated as a compromise between formal and traditional law.

4 Overall findings

In this chapter we present findings at country-level. They are structured around the issues identified in the terms of reference, i.e. relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and cross-cutting issues.

4.1 Relevance

Relevance Finding 1: Shelter, ICLA, EFSD and WASH projects are relevant in South Sudan

NRC projects in South Sudan as presented and reported in project documents are clearly relevant to the needs of the affected target groups in the areas where NRC is active. This is confirmed by beneficiaries interviewed who state that the inputs have been in line with their needs. The projects are also in line with the Consolidated Appeal Process and cluster priorities.

Relevance Finding 2: Part of the WASH strategy was not relevant

NRC chose a WASH strategy for latrine-building based on a methodology that was successfully tested in an Asian context. Interviews with staff indicate that there was an assumption that the model for WASH latrines called Community Led Total Sanitation "CLTS", widely used in South East Asia, could be applied in Warrap state. The methodology was not sufficiently adapted to local circumstances and the intervention largely failed in the South Sudanese context. This negatively affected the relevance of the intervention.[40]

Relevance Finding 3: Projects are not always in accordance with beneficiaries' priorities

There was a lack of proper baseline studies at local level, and attempts at adapting projects to local circumstances were not systematic enough (e.g. agricultural inputs, schools' construction, WASH implementation). Lack of competence, lack of contextual knowledge and overemphasis on output targets all contributed to this.

Relevance Finding 4: Some projects were not implemented in a timely manner

As mentioned above, several projects experienced severe delays. A combination of late fund transfers, late recruitment of key staff, slow procurement, challenging logistics and late decision making by local authorities all contributed to this.

4.2 Effectiveness

Effectiveness Finding 1: Effectiveness data is at times unreliable or irrelevant

In the above findings, we have reported on gaps in support systems that affect operations in South Sudan. Data on effectiveness is related to whether targets have been achieved. From project documentation, reported achievements indicate high effectiveness, given the South Sudan context.

The work plan (EFSD) and a few reports obtained (including EFSD situation reports) demonstrate NRC's commitment to developing tools for monitoring programme effectiveness. However, the data provided reflect targets that are generally output focussed and the evaluation team has encountered a series of anecdotal evidence leading us to question the quality of the reported output achievements. Our concern mostly relates to the

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[40] In comments to the draft report, NRC notes that the donor proposed and insisted on the CLTS model.

EFSD programme (for which detailed data was available) and is, at least in part, echoed in other evaluators' assessment of data quality.[41]

Our assessment of effectiveness takes NRC's reporting of achievements as a point of departure. The evaluation team therefore needs to highlight that we do not feel confident regarding the consistency of the quality of data on achievements in South Sudan.

Effectiveness Finding 2: ICLA is regarded as highly effective

ICLA activities were consistently lauded by the various stakeholders, ranging from beneficiaries to Government and UN representatives.

Beneficiaries in Alek confirmed the positive outcome of the NRC programme assistance to them citing improved re-integration with host communities, successful land acquisition, increased protection and livelihoods from knowledge and skills gained from trainings. Staff and local authorities in Aweil attested to the same.

NRC contributions to cluster coordination were described by UN co-leads as outstanding due to good operational information, consistent attendance and information sharing in coordination fora, willingness to invest in coordination with hands-on work and the ability to participate at both local and national levels. It was the impression of the team that ICLA staff had done much of the cluster related ground work in Aweil and in Juba (prior to the arrival of the Protection and Advocacy Advisor).

Effectiveness Finding 3: The Shelter/School construction is of good quality but the standardised design lessens effectiveness

The schools constructed were considered by beneficiaries, and found by the evaluation team, to be of overall good quality, despite some design flaws. The site selection was appropriately done in close consultation with authorities and the handover process was described as simple and clear. However, the standardised design did not take the local context into account leading to overcrowding in some schools and overcapacity in others.

Effectiveness Finding 4: Sida funding allowed preparedness measures to be implemented, improving emergency shelter effectiveness

Sida framework funding allowed NRC to establish preparedness for emergency shelter, showing commendable synergies with different donor funding sources. This capacity was effectively put to use following 2011 events in Abyei. NRC was able to respond more rapidly than would otherwise have been possible with temporary shelter for populations in transit and building materials to displaced households.[42]

Effectiveness Finding 5: Effectiveness varies between and within core competencies, according to circumstances

The societal context, organisational history, number and capacity of staff and external partners, logistics and market access vary greatly between NRC's different projects in South Sudan. In this environment NRC is not able to maintain a consistent level of effectiveness.

The team noted several instances where lack of sufficient investment in preparatory work and in use of local knowledge lessened effectiveness; for example inappropriate methodology for introducing latrines, monitoring activities not considering seasonal impact, overly standardised school construction. These have been mentioned in the sections on core competencies.

On the other hand the team also noted good adaptation such as using mobile ICLA teams to test demand in new locations, creatively mediating between formal and traditional law to

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[41] See e.g. Herd et.al., 2012
[42] Project documentation, confirmed by staff and UN interviewees.

address women's needs in land cases as well as trying to create individually focused links between projects, such as the employment of vocationally-trained IDPs in construction work.

Effectiveness Finding 6: NRC conflict sensitivity is challenged by contextual knowledge gaps

The relatively limited organisational in-country history and high dependence on expatriate staff, combined with working in an extremely fluid context with rudimentary counterpart institutions, created serious challenges in terms of conflict sensitivity. After interviewing several staff members in all three countries, it is the view of the evaluation team that in comparison with the situation in Somalia and Pakistan, the South Sudan country team shows less understanding and encounters more problems related to the conflict context.[43] An example of this is the fact that the NRC Alek office had to ask the evaluation team to reconsider holding interviews with certain authorities due to bad relations at that point in time, and that the chief in one village refused to meet the evaluation team, reportedly because he did not want to see NGOs operating in Warrap. Similarly, the country team has encountered recruitment problems due to the ethnic background of proposed staff members.

We are aware that the comparison is strongly influenced by the fact that both Pakistan and Somalia benefit from top leadership of domestic origin.

4.3 Efficiency

Efficiency Finding 1: Weak government institutions were a challenge to NRC

Key informant interviews confirm document review impressions that Government institutional strength varies between systems levels and according to the capacity of individual office bearers. Where national legislation is in place, the interpretation of the same may vary significantly at National, State and Local levels. Such gaps in the South Sudanese institutional infrastructure imply an absence of functioning counterparts on many levels. This in turn caused inefficiencies in the form of delays in decision-making, misunderstandings in coordination and significant gaps in contextual knowledge.

Efficiency Finding 2: NRC support systems were not coping with the volume of activities. This decreased efficiency.

Multiple gaps, outlined in the separate section on Management, have increased costs and decreased output. While we have not attempted to quantify this, the cost implications are likely to have been substantial. This is supported by a comparison of the amount of funding spent on actual direct project-related goods and services in the projects covered by the PETS in South Sudan, Pakistan and Somalia which shows large differences between countries. In both Pakistan and Somalia, this share was about 60% - in South Sudan it was 40%. Thus, a larger share of the total funding was used for overhead costs in the South Sudan PETS project, and a smaller share reached the target population. In South Sudan, the PETS project was construction of schools whereas in Pakistan and Somalia they were NFI distribution and Shelter construction respectively. We see no systemic reason why school construction should have a lower share of direct project costs and a higher share of overhead costs.

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[43] In both Somalia and Pakistan, multiple stakeholders consistently praised NRC's contextual understanding and the organisation's external relations were characterised by a deep understanding of both institutional and cultural aspects affecting their operations. This was not case in South Sudan.

Efficiency Finding 3: NRC "surge" investments are on-going and the situation is improving

At the time of the evaluation, things were improving but many issues remained to be addressed. NRC had recognised the gaps in support systems and, at the time of the evaluation, was investing to rectify them.

4.4 Sustainability

Sustainability Finding: NRC interventions are not sustainable but, given the context, are connected and coherent

NRC interventions in South Sudan are not financially or organisationally sustainable. As indicated above, some of them may be sustainable in terms of outcomes (such as resolved ICLA cases, some livelihood interventions and elements of school construction). While sustainability is not to be expected in humanitarian interventions, connectedness is. NRC efforts to be connected include investing significantly in the overall functioning of the humanitarian system as exemplified by the involvement in cluster coordination and other coordination efforts. The organisation also invests significantly in capacity building of local authorities. Capacity building efforts are hampered by the rudimentary state of existing institutions. Projects are internally and externally coherent, as seen by the linkages of some ICLA activities with other NRC programmes, the Sida-Norad funding complementarity and the close linkages that NRC has built up with clusters.

4.5 Cross-cutting issues

Gender Finding 1: NRC is addressing gender issues within its core competencies

Project design commonly includes gendered targets for both activities and beneficiary selection. Reports are disaggregated by gender. The team encountered several examples of project adaptation due to gender-based feedback (such as including a limited number of males in trainings that initially were reserved exclusively for females, negotiating temporary land "users rights" for females when confronted with rigid traditional laws).

Gender Finding 2: NRC ICLA does not engage in gender based violence cases

NRC ICLA has a global policy not to take up cases relating to gender based violence. In South Sudan, interviews with staff and the ICLA Advisor's report indicate that, due to resource restraints and potential threats to the security of staff, NRC was in the process of assuring that ICLA staff not take on gender based violence cases. It was felt that staff lacked the training to intervene effectively, perhaps even placing potential clients at greater risk.

Environment Finding: there are ad hoc mitigation activities

Some activities designed to mitigate environmental damage are included in the country programme. For example, awareness raising and tree sapling distribution are components of the food security and livelihood project. However, no environmental impact assessment is made, neither in needs assessments nor in reporting.

Corruption Finding 1: NRC invests in anti-corruption

The incidence of unethical practices and corruption is high in South Sudan. The Finance Manager said that NRC staff has experienced corrupt practices or attempts at corruption by some vendors/contractors seeking favours. NRC staff members are well oriented to the procedures and compliance with the Code of Conduct. However, some staff implied that it is

difficult to provide evidence due to weak legal machinery and to a fear of 'whistle-blowing' by people who have information or evidence.

NRC practices a policy of zero tolerance on corruption. Interviews with staff confirmed a strict code of conduct which has been consistently followed. It is backed up by management as shown by a willingness to manage significant conflict arising from such a principled stance, including with selected local authorities and suppliers. For example, some key informants attributed the poor relationship between NRC and local authorities in Warrap State to conflicts of interest arising from local authorities' high expectations to benefit from tendering opportunities and local recruitment of staff.

Corruption Finding 2: There are both systemic and specific problems indicating corruption risk

Systemic problems indicating corruption risks are both general and specific in nature. A specific issue brought to the evaluation team's attention by both national and expatriate staff members is the fact that purchase requests raised by managers for processing by national staff include a specification of the amount that NRC is prepared to pay for the purchase requested. It is noted by members of the staff that, in the vast majority of cases, the competitive tenders NRC receives quote a price that is very close to the amount specified in the internal purchase request. This indicates either an exceptionally good knowledge of prevailing market prices or a likely leakage of "willingness to pay" information to bidders. Inflating quotation prices and changing or presenting fake invoices has also been experienced among staff and service providers.

5   Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusions

The relative quality and stability of the ICLA programme may or may not be a consequence of its longer history. It is the programme closest to the "core" of NRC's mission and reflects the organisation's lead role in this technical field. Its advocacy related activities have successfully influenced national legislation, its clinics often function as entry points for displaced people in need of assistance and its training activities are cited as successful.

Shelter is strongly focussed on school construction. The programme is delivering what it plans to and the overall quality of construction is good. The projects are well coordinated with local authorities, increasing the likelihood of sustainable use. However, standardised design has led to under-utilisation in some cases and overcrowding in others. WASH activities, added relatively recently to the shelter programme, have been hampered by limited human resources and a lack of sufficient local knowledge. EFSD has expanded rapidly, with a strong focus on food security and livelihoods, technical areas where NRC South Sudan lacks solid experience and skill.

NRC's operations in South Sudan have been relevant in relation to overall needs and context. Activities have expanded rapidly in terms of volume, geographical coverage and programming complexity. The projects have been implemented under very difficult operational circumstances and NRC should be respected for achievements made.

However, support systems have not kept up with the rapid expansion. The gaps that have developed have been serious enough to impact the quality of programming, lessening effectiveness. During our visit it was clear that there were serious organisational capacity and competence gaps in terms of technical skills, contextual understanding and managerial clarity.

We have concerns that projects lack baselines, or even location-specific assessments, and are output focused, emphasising on timely delivery more than quality of outcomes. While monitoring systems are in the process of being established, field monitoring is often hampered by insecurity, inadequate logistics or inadequate managerial capacity (structural gaps, competence gaps, vacancies) – or a combination of all three.

NRC's recognition of these problems was not timely. However, at the time of the evaluation it was in the process of addressing these problems through a "surge" of additional capacity, subsequent to decisions taken in June 2012. The support system problems were in part a result of a mismatch between operational priorities and the competency profile of previous country management. This situation was apparently compounded by staff turnover in Oslo.

That the situation was allowed to deteriorate for so long indicates a systemic risk in NRC's decentralised management structure within which country directors have significant autonomy. The system appears to lack sufficient checks and balances, allowing it to signal when expansion progresses faster than organisational capacity can handle. Such systemic issues will be discussed further in the synthesis report.

5.2 Recommendations

Recommendation 1: NRC South Sudan should focus on consolidation

The surge capacity should remain in place as long as needed. We recommend a minimum of 12-18 months for the following necessary actions to be taken: Managerial clarity needs to be established, vacancies filled, finance, administration and logistics structures stabilised, staff trained and quality control, including a stable monitoring and evaluation system, made consistent.

In order to consolidate improvements for ongoing operations, and to ensure these become well embedded in the Country Office's institutional culture, we strongly advise against opening up new operations or new geographical areas until the above issues have been addressed - or such expansion becomes a clear humanitarian imperative.

Recommendation 2: NRC South Sudan should systematically seek synergies and exploit the potential for interaction between core competencies in current geographical areas of operation

An area approach centred on current operational bases should be adopted (we have understood that this is in line with the strategy discussions that were under way during our visit). This will simplify attention to cost, based on existing facilities.

Recommendation 3: NRC South Sudan should continue to invest in cluster structures and coordination

NRC has shown the willingness and the ability to provide capacity to support the functioning of the humanitarian system through contributions to cluster structures and other coordination efforts. This has, and will continue to, absorb capacity. NRC should continue to invest in such efforts and should seek explicit donor approval and financial support for such activities.

Recommendation 4: NRC should continue to invest in capacity building of government structures

NRC contributions to capacity building of government structures at different levels have been highlighted by key informants interviewed, for example support to education (school inspectors, community involvement) and housing, land and property (support to drafting and dissemination of Land Law, mediation). The willingness to invest in such activities is a comparative strength and should receive continued support.

Recommendation 5: NRC South Sudan should inventory existing food security and livelihoods and WASH capacities outside the organisation and seek to establish complementary relationships

Given the relative weakness of NRC's competence base in food security and livelihoods and in WASH, the organisation should inventory existing capacities in the region. The aim would be to explore whether in-house capacity could be complemented through contractual or cooperative arrangements with established NGO/agencies/companies in the field.

Annex 1: List of Interviews

Information on the field work itinerary is provided in the body of the report. Names of beneficiary respondents are not included for reasons of anonymity.

No	Date	Name of Person	Sex	Program/Description	Organisation	Place	Interviewer
1	25.09.2012	Zedek Malile	M	WASH Coordinator	NRC	Nairobi	Bjorn and Charles
2	02.10.2012	Gregory Norton	M	Country Coordinator	NRC	Juba	Charles and Leben
3	8.10.2012	Pierre Kadet, Phd	M	Programme Manager NBeG and Warrap	NRC	Alek	Charles and Leben
4	8.10.2012	Derek Kyambadde	M	Project Coordinator for WASH/ Emergency Shelter/DRR	NRC	Alek	Charles and Leben
5	8.10.2012	Brimo Majok	M	Team Leader, ICLA Alek	NRC	Alek	Charles and Leben
FGD: 1	**BENEFICIARIES AT MAYEN GUMEL TRANSIT SITE WARRAP STATE** *Block 24 or Khartoum Gedida (Food Security group- Returnees), Kuajok* Translator: Ayul, Education Team Leader at NRC Alek						
13	9.10.2012		6M 7F			Mayen Gumel	Charles and Leben
FGD: 2	**BENEFICIARIES AT BLOCK 25 TRANSIT SITE, WARRAP STATE** Translator: Ayul, Education Team Leader at NRC Alek						
7	9.10.2012		5M 2F				Charles and Leben
FGD: 3	**BENEFICIARIES AT BLOCK 14 TRANSIT SITE, WARRAP STATE** *(ICLA group-5 persons), Kuajok* (Conducted in Arabic).						
5	9.10.2012		3M 2F				Leben
FGD: 4	**BENEFICIARIES AT MAJAK AHEER/TURALER PAYAM TRANSIT SITE, WARRAP STATE** *Majak Aheer, Turalei, Twic (Shelter Group)* Translator: Ayul, Education Team Leader at NRC Alek						
8	10.10.2012		4M 4F				Charles and Leben
No	**Date**	**Name of Person**	**Sex**	**Prog/Description**	**Org.**	**Place**	**Interviewer**
1	10.10.2012	Fiona Mattick	F	Area Manager	NRC	Alek	Leben and Charles
2	11.10.2012	Stephen Lukudu,	M	Team Leader, WASH	NRC	Alek	Leben
3	16.10.2012	Jamesco Deng,	M	Dep.Direct. Plan. Aweil	GoSS	Aweil	Leben (by phone)
4	17.10.2012	Wilfred Iramaku	M	National Field Officer Kuajok/Warrap State, South Sudan	UNOCHA	Kuajok	Charles (by Skype)
5	22.10.2012	Lino Duk	M	Minister of local Govt.,	GoSS	Aweil	Leben (by phone)

No	Date	Name of Person	Sex	Prog/Description	Org.	Place	Interviewer
6	22.10.2012	Gatwech Peter Kulang	M	D.G. of NGO Affairs, RRC Juba	GoSS	Juba	Leben
No	**Date**	**Name of Person**	**Sex**	**Prog/Description**	**Org.**	**Place**	**Interviewer**
1	7.10.2012	Heidi Carrubba	F	Programme Coordinator	NRC	Juba	Bjorn
2	7.10.2012	Siri Elverland	F	Protection and Advocacy Advisor	NRC	Juba	Bjorn
3	7.10.2012	Siri Elverland	F	Separate interview for role as ex-NORCAP secondee	NORCAP	Juba/ missions elsewhere	Bjorn
4	8.10.2012	Ellen Dahl	F	Global Support Manager/ Surge team	NRC	Juba	Bjorn
5 6 7 8 9 10 11	8.10.2012	James Tong Dut Joseph Bel Awan Deng Mangok Kenyang Dau Mabior Jai Kuan Anyar Mou Atak Baak Joseph Deng	All M	Group interview National staff M and E Education Logistics Shelter Training ICLA EFSD Finance	NRC	Aweil	Bjorn
12 13 14	9.10.2012	Jai Kuan Anyar Kur Kur Kur John Piol Ngor	M M M	Group Interview ICLA staff	NRC	Aweil	Bjorn
15	9.10.2012	James Tong Dut	M	Monitoring and Evaluation Supervisor	NRC	Aweil	Bjorn
816	9.10.2012	Jamila El Abdellaoui	F	ICLA Projec t Coordinator	NRC	Aweil	Bjorn
17	10.10.2012	Syann Williams	F	Head of Sub Office	UNHCR	Aweil	Bjorn
18 19	10.10.2012	Takeshura Mugawi Taban Emanuel	M M	Head of Sub Office Field Officer	UNHCR	Aweil	Bjorn
20	10.10.2012	Apicu Aric Ibrahim	M	Logistic/OIC	UNHCR	Aweil South	Bjorn
21	10.10.2012	Luka Deng Majuk	M	Pajam Administrator,	Local Authority	Njuluth Pajam, Aweil Centre Country	Bjorn

22	11.10.2012	Mou Atak Baak	M	APC, EFSD	NRC	Aweil	Bjorn
23	12.10.2012	Emilie Welam	F	Swedish Embassy	Sida	Juba	Bjorn
24	11.10.2012	Laura Swift	F	Shelter Cluster Coord	NRC	Aweil	Bjorn
25	12.10.2012	Francesca	F	Project Manager ICLA	NRC	Juba	Bjorn
26 27 28 29	12.10.2012	James Arike Charles Jay Wilkes George Ombis	M M M M	Program Manager Specialist At. Progr Officer Reg Progr Officer	USAID/ OFDA	Juba	Bjorn
30	12.10.2012	Peter Trotter	M	Protection Cluster Lead	UNHCR	Juba	Bjorn
31	12.10.2012	Aasmund Lok	M	Child Protection Off	NORCAP/UNICEF	Juba	Bjorn
32	12.10.2012	William Kollie	M	Mr Lok's supervisor	NORCAP/UNICEF	Juba	Bjorn

Annex 2: List of Documents, South Sudan

(The list may contain duplicates)

Published documents and external sources

Cook, D. T. and L. N. Moro, 2012, Governing South Sudan: Opinions of South Sudanese on a Government that can meet citizens expectations, Juba, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. http://www.ndi.org.

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IOM, 2012b, Sudan/South Sudan Emergency Response: Situation Report, 31 July 2012 [http://www.iom.int/ (downloaded on 17 October 2012).

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Karim et al, 1996, Operations Lifeline Sudan: A Review, OLS, Geneva, UN.

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US Committee for Refugees, 2003, World Refugee Survey 2003 USCR

WFP, 2012, Report on Food Security and Nutrition in South Sudan 2012

Beck, T., 2006, Evaluating Humanitarian Action using the OECD-DAC Criteria, ALNAP

Various confidential documents

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Quarterly Reports
SD Q2 status report 2011 (251370)
SD Q4 2011 report (265526)
SD Sudan Q2 Quarterly Report 2010 (218163)
Sudan Quarterly Report Q1 2011 (243528)
Sudan Quarterly Report Q2 2011 (251011)
Sudan SD Q3 Status Report 2010 (225176)
Sudan SD Q4 Status Report 2010 (233143)
Agreements
6XFM1102_Letter from Sida confirming no need for time sheets (244949)
SDFL1001 Danida grant letter (203408)
SDFM1104 Grant agreement NRC AID-OFDA-G-11-00116 SUDAN (248131)
SDFM1204 Donor Funding Approval (275789)

SDFS1001 Signed Agreement (216303)

6XFM1102 - NRC-Sida - Framework Agreement 2011-2013 - Countries and budgets (222978)

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SDFM1202 Sida Annual Plan and RAF 2012 (283534)

SD Annual Plan of Action 2011 (234323)

SD Annual Plan of Action 2011 (234323)

Reports

SDFL1001_SDFL1101 Danida Status Report-19 Nov 2010 (227044)

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Herd, C., Sharp, B. and A Crosskey, Evaluation of Food Security Programme 2010-2012 South Sudan, The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and partners

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SDFM1101 SDFK1101 NMFA LFA Food Security in NBeG (240176)

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SDFL1001 ICLA NBeG Danida Proposal (224051)

SDFM1001 SDFL1002 Proposal 30.11.2009 (198516)

SDFM1101 SDFK1101 NMFA Proposal Food Security in NBeG (240177)

SDFM1101 SDFS1102 NMFA Proposal Emergency Shelter-April 14 (240338)

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SDFM1104 NRC OFDA Cost Budget Proposal 16.03.2011 (237444)

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SDFM1204 Project Proposal Danida (283500)

SDFS1001 Shelter Narrative Proposal and LFA - final (202864)

SDFS1201 Gap Shelter Proposal logframe (284224)
Budgets
SDFK1102 01 Improving livelihood in Warrap 13.12.10 (228971)
SDFK1201 01 HUM 27.02.2012 6.5 M NOK (283128)
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SDFK1203 00 Danida 15.12.11 (283113)
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SDFL1001 ICLA NBeG Danida Budget (195604)
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SDFL1201 00 Danida 15.12.11 (283112)
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SDFM1001 NMFA ICLA-EFSD budget (212756)
SDFM1101 SDFK1101 SDFL1102 Donor Form MFA frame (233556)
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SDFM1203 SDFK1203 SDFT1201 Donor Form Sida 2012 (283177)
SDFS1001 P-Info 16 Dec 09 (215837)
SDFS1201 00 GAP 05.12.11 (284223)
SDFS1202 01 HUM 27.02.11 3.5 M NOK (283130)
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SDFT1201 02 ALP in NBeG 22.11.11 (283143)

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EFSD 2011 MASTER PLAN
NRC Strategy for South Sudan 2012-2014. (Final Draft_March,2012)
NRC Budgeting and Planning Instructions for 2013
Surveys, baselines:
August 2012 Base Line Survey Report For NRC-Food Security Northern Bhar-el-Ghazal State
Copy of FS 2012 Baseline Survey DataBase - NBEG – 2012
Project Proposals:
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NRC-178484 - SDFM1204 Project Proposal Danida (FINAL 2012)
SHELTER _2012-2013 (SDFS 1202)
Food Security in Warrap: _2010 (SDFK1102 SIDA)
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EFSD SITREP 2011 20111208
EFSD Livelihoods Trainee List
EFSD: Beneficiary General Database for SDFK1102 and SDFK1202 - Sida projects
Basic Adult Literacy Data Base March 2012
NRC, 2011, Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Report for ICLA NbeG December 2011
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March-2012 Impact Monitoring and Evaluation narrative Analysis report For Basic Adult Literacy
May 2012 Evaluation Report For NRC-Food Security and Livelihood in Warrap State

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ICLA Aweil ICU Weekly Report 17-21 Sept 12

ICLA Aweil Monitoring Unit Report September 2012

Impact Monitoring Questionnaire Data Base for FSL Warrap May, 2012

Legal Assistance-Output June 2012

March Core Activity Database to Upload

Shelter M and E Database

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SDFK1201 NMFA LFA FSL NBEG SS 120314

SDFK1203 DANIDA LFA Food Security in NbeG South Sudan 120608

SDFK1206 TELETHON LFA FSL NBEG SS 111208 - alt 1 240 new HH only

Documents South Sudan PETS

SDFS1001 Signed Agreement (216303)

NRC-139006 - SOFS1011 Proposal to Donor 24 Nov 2010

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SDFS1001 P-Info 16 Dec 09 (215837)

SDFS1001 revised P-Info 13.09.11 (L)(254051)

SDFS1001 Revised Budget sent to Norad (L)(254122)

SDFS 1001 transactions list

Monitoring tools for School Construction

Financial Handbook Sudan

Stock Report - NRC Aweil -August- 2012

Financial Reports/Records

SDFS1001 - Revised Budget (15 September 2011)

SDFS1001 revised P-Info 13 09 11 (L)(254051)

Project Summary SD 201113

Annex 4 NRC Sudan procurement flowchart

Annex 5 Bank Signatories list

Signed Financial Statement

Progress Reports

Enrollment 2010 – 2012 in schools constructed

NRC 2010 Quarterly Country Progam Report Sudan Q1 2011

NRC 2010 Quarterly Country Progam Report Sudan Q2 2010

NRC 2010 Quarterly Country Progam Report Sudan Q2 2011

NRC 2010 Quarterly Country Progam Report Sudan Q3 2010

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NRC 2011 Quarterly Country Progam Report Sudan Q4 2010

NRC 2012 Quarterly Country Progam Report Sudan Q4 2011